An investigative analysis reveals a troubling pattern of asset accumulation among the state's political representatives, with average wealth increasing by 272% between 2011 and 2021
In the verdant political landscape of West Bengal, where the Trinamool Congress has held power since 2011, a striking transformation has occurred—not in the lives of ordinary citizens, but in the bank accounts of their elected representatives. A comprehensive analysis of electoral affidavits spanning a decade reveals a remarkable surge in wealth among Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), raising critical questions about the sources of this prosperity and the mechanisms of political accountability.
The Numbers Tell a Compelling Story
The trajectory of wealth accumulation among West Bengal's MLAs follows a steep upward curve. In 2011, when the Trinamool Congress first wrested power from the Left Front's 34-year rule, the average assets per MLA stood at ₹68.92 lakhs. By 2016, this figure had more than doubled to ₹1.46 crores, and by 2021, it had surged further to ₹2.53 crores—representing a staggering 272% increase over the decade.
This wealth concentration becomes even more apparent when examining the number of "crorepati" legislators. In 2011, only 44 MLAs (15% of the assembly) held assets exceeding one crore rupees. This number jumped to 100 (34%) in 2016 and exploded to 158 (54%) by 2021. In absolute terms, the number of crorepati MLAs increased by 259% over ten years, far outpacing any reasonable explanation based on legitimate salary growth or investment returns.
The data, meticulously compiled by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) through analysis of self-sworn affidavits submitted to the Election Commission, paints a picture of a political class growing increasingly distant from the constituents they represent.
The Top Wealth Accumulators: A Closer Examination
Jakir Hossain: The ₹39 Crore Question
At the apex of wealth accumulation stands Jakir Hossain, the Trinamool Congress MLA from Jangipur constituency in Murshidabad district and a Minister of State for Labour in the West Bengal government. Between 2016 and 2021, Hossain's declared assets soared from ₹28.04 crores to ₹67.22 crores—an astronomical increase of ₹39.18 crores in just five years, representing a 140% growth rate.
What makes this accumulation particularly noteworthy is the source of income Hossain declares: business. His annual income for 2019-20, as per income tax returns, stood at ₹9.75 crores, having grown from ₹94.78 lakhs in 2015-16. While business can indeed be lucrative, the scale and pace of asset growth—averaging nearly ₹8 crores per year—invites scrutiny about the nature of these business operations and their potential connections to political power.
Hossain's case is not isolated. In 2016, he was already the second-richest MLA in the state with ₹22 crores in assets, trailing only Samir Chakraborty from Taldangra, who then held ₹40.59 crores. By 2021, Hossain had surpassed Chakraborty to become the wealthiest legislator in West Bengal.
Ahmed Javed Khan: From ₹17 Crores to ₹32 Crores
The second-highest asset accumulator is Ahmed Javed Khan, representing the Kasba constituency in South 24 Parganas district. Khan, who serves as State Disaster Management Minister, saw his wealth increase by ₹15.03 crores between 2016 and 2021, rising from ₹17.29 crores to ₹32.33 crores—an 87% jump.
What distinguishes Khan's case is an even more dramatic historical trajectory. Analysis of his assets from 2011 shows they stood at merely ₹2.16 crores—meaning his wealth multiplied nearly 15-fold over the decade from 2011 to 2021, representing a staggering 1,396% increase. This prompted the ADR to flag his case as exhibiting the "highest growth of assets" among sitting MLAs in their 2016 analysis.
Khan declares his income sources as "rental, salary, business and auxiliary service," yet his annual income as per tax returns was only ₹52.81 lakhs in 2019-20—making the asset accumulation rate mathematically challenging to reconcile with declared earnings.
Firhad Hakim: The Urban Development Minister's Fortune
Firhad Hakim, the Urban Development Minister and former Mayor of Kolkata Municipal Corporation, rounds out the top three with an asset increase of ₹7.36 crores (123% growth), from ₹5.97 crores in 2016 to ₹13.34 crores in 2021. Hakim, who represents the Kolkata Port constituency, declares his income from "business, bank interest, and salary from Government of West Bengal," with an annual income of ₹1.98 crores.
As the minister overseeing urban development in a state where real estate and construction contracts flow through government channels, Hakim's portfolio raises inevitable questions about potential conflicts of interest. His business interests, while not necessarily illegal, operate in sectors directly influenced by the ministry he heads.
The Pattern Emerges: Nine Out of Ten
A striking pattern emerges when examining the complete list of MLAs with the highest asset increases between 2016 and 2021. Of the top ten wealth accumulators, nine belong to the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC). The remaining spot is occupied by Sabya Sachi Dutta, who contested as a BJP candidate in 2021 but was previously with AITC—meaning all ten were associated with the ruling party during most of the period under examination.
The complete top ten list includes Subrata Saha (Sagardighi, ₹6.37 crore increase), Sujit Bose (Bidhannagar, ₹5.25 crore increase), Firdousi Begum (Sonarpur Uttar, ₹5.16 crore increase), Ujjal Biswas (Krishnanagar Dakshin, ₹5.11 crore increase), Jyoti Priya Mallick (Habra, ₹4.77 crore increase), and Dr. Sudipto Roy (Sreerampur, ₹4.55 crore increase).
Party-Wise Analysis: TMC Leads the Pack
When examining 210 re-contesting MLAs who fought both 2016 and 2021 elections, party-wise patterns become evident. Among AITC MLAs who re-contested, the average asset increase was ₹1.36 crores—an 84.74% growth rate. This far outpaces the BJP (47.4%), Congress (46.61%), and CPI(M) (73.12%).
The average assets of AITC re-contesting MLAs stood at ₹1.60 crores in 2016 and reached ₹2.96 crores by 2021. This suggests that being in power at the state level correlates with substantially higher wealth accumulation compared to opposition parties—a troubling finding that raises questions about the misuse of political office for personal enrichment.
The Paradox of Mamata Banerjee
Amidst this sea of rising fortunes stands an intriguing anomaly: Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee herself. Banerjee's declared assets actually decreased from ₹30.45 lakhs in 2016 to ₹16.72 lakhs in 2021—a 45.08% reduction. By 2021, her total worth stood at just ₹15.38 lakhs, making her the poorest among all 31 Chief Ministers in India, according to the ADR report.
Her affidavit shows cash in hand of ₹69,255, bank balance of ₹13.5 lakhs (including election expenditure account), 9 grams of jewelry worth ₹43,837, and no landed property or residential house in her name. She declared that she does not own any immovable assets and lives in a government accommodation.
This stark contrast between Banerjee's personal austerity and the wealth explosion among her party colleagues presents a complex picture. It could indicate genuine personal integrity on the CM's part, or it could suggest that the mechanisms of wealth accumulation operate at different levels of the party hierarchy, insulating the top leadership from direct implication while enriching those in the middle and lower tiers of political power.
Sources of Income: Business as the Common Thread
A pattern emerges when examining the declared sources of income for MLAs with high asset growth. The most common declaration is "business"—a broad category that encompasses everything from legitimate entrepreneurship to potentially questionable commercial activities facilitated by political connections.
For instance, Jakir Hossain declares business income, as does Sabya Sachi Dutta, Firhad Hakim, and several others in the top ranks. The problem with "business" as a declared income source is its opacity. Unlike salaried positions where income is easily verifiable, business income can encompass a vast array of activities, many of which may involve government contracts, land deals, or industries that require regulatory approvals—all areas where an MLA's influence could prove invaluable.
Several MLAs declare "MLA honorarium" or "salary from West Bengal Legislative Assembly" as primary income sources, yet show asset growth that far exceeds what could be accumulated through legislative salary alone. The monthly honorarium for a West Bengal MLA is approximately ₹72,000 plus allowances, totaling perhaps ₹12-15 lakhs annually—making it impossible to accumulate crores in assets through this income stream alone without substantial other sources.
The Poorest MLAs: A Study in Contrasts
At the opposite end of the wealth spectrum lie MLAs whose declared assets seem almost inconceivable for state legislators. Nirmal Kumar Dhara, a BJP MLA from Indus constituency in Bankura district, declared total assets of merely ₹1,700 in his 2021 affidavit. He owns no immovable assets and has minimal movable assets.
Pundarikakshya Saha, an AITC MLA from Nabadwip in Nadia district, declared assets of ₹30,423. Chandana Bauri, a BJP MLA from Saltora (SC) constituency in Bankura, declared assets worth ₹62,296.
These cases of extreme poverty among MLAs raise different concerns. How do legislators with virtually no personal wealth sustain themselves and their families? Do they become more vulnerable to corruption precisely because of their financial desperation? Or do these declarations represent deliberate underreporting to avoid scrutiny?
The wealth gap between the richest and poorest MLAs is stark: Jakir Hossain's ₹67.22 crores compared to Nirmal Kumar Dhara's ₹1,700 represents a ratio of approximately 1:3.95 million. Such extreme inequality within a legislative body that is supposed to represent the people raises profound questions about representation and democratic legitimacy.
Criminalization: The Other Troubling Trend
The rise in wealth among West Bengal MLAs has been accompanied by another disturbing trend: increasing criminalization of the legislature. In 2011, 34% of MLAs had declared criminal cases against themselves. This rose to 37% in 2016 and jumped to 49% in 2021. Nearly half the current assembly faces criminal charges.
More concerning is the rise in serious criminal cases—those involving offenses with maximum punishment of five years or more, including murder, attempt to murder, kidnapping, and crimes against women. Such cases affected 32% of MLAs in 2016 but increased to 39% by 2021. This means that 113 out of 292 analyzed MLAs in the current assembly face serious criminal charges.
The correlation between wealth accumulation and criminalization deserves closer examination. Are MLAs with criminal backgrounds more likely to engage in wealth accumulation through illegal means? Or does the political system reward those willing to operate outside legal boundaries? The data suggests that political parties increasingly field candidates with criminal backgrounds, perhaps calculating that such individuals bring electoral advantages or financial resources to campaigns.
Systemic Issues: Electoral Bonds and Undisclosed Funding
The wealth accumulation patterns among West Bengal MLAs cannot be understood in isolation from the broader political financing ecosystem. The now-scrapped electoral bonds scheme, which the Supreme Court struck down in 2024, had enabled massive flows of money into political parties with complete opacity.
West Bengal's ruling Trinamool Congress was the second-biggest beneficiary of electoral bonds nationally, accumulating over ₹1,600 crores through this mechanism. Investigations revealed that companies facing government scrutiny made substantial donations and subsequently saw investigations stall or close. For instance, IFB Agro Limited, after facing a facility shutdown and government raids in West Bengal, purchased electoral bonds worth ₹40 crores in 2022.
This suggests a quid pro quo relationship where businesses facing regulatory action buy political protection through party donations—money that eventually filters down through the political hierarchy to fund campaigns, support party workers, and potentially line the pockets of individual politicians.
The Trinamool Congress's income itself showed a remarkable 600% increase, from ₹74.41 crores in 2020-21 to ₹545.75 crores in 2021-22, coinciding with the 2021 assembly elections. Where does this money go? While party accounts show income, the distribution mechanisms remain opaque, creating opportunities for wealth accumulation by party office-holders and legislators.
Governance Implications: When MLAs Get Rich, Do Citizens Prosper?
The fundamental question raised by this investigation is whether the wealth accumulation by MLAs has corresponded to improved governance and citizen welfare. The answer appears to be negative.
West Bengal's economic performance has been lackluster during the period of MLA enrichment. The state's real gross state domestic product (GSDP) grew at an average rate of just 4.3% from 2012-13 to 2021-22, compared to the national average of 5.6%. The state's share in national GDP fell from 6.8% in 1990-91 to 5.8% in 2021-22. Per capita income in West Bengal was 20% below the national average as of 2021-22.
Public finances reflect similar distress. West Bengal's fiscal deficit stood at 4% of GSDP in 2022-23, while revenue deficit was 2.6% of GSDP—higher than median states. The state government's debt has ballooned from approximately ₹6.33 lakh crores in 2023-24 to over ₹7 lakh crores in 2024-25, projected to cross ₹8 lakh crores in 2025-26. The state plans to borrow ₹1 lakh crore in 2025-26 alone.
Meanwhile, West Bengal has become the fourth-largest sender of out-migrants to other states according to 2011 Census data, with growing numbers of Bengalis working as low-wage, unskilled laborers in cities like Bangalore, Mumbai, and Delhi. This suggests economic distress driving people away even as their elected representatives grow richer.
The disconnect is stark: as MLAs accumulated wealth at unprecedented rates, the state they governed slipped economically, borrowed heavily, and failed to provide opportunities that could keep its citizens at home.
Legal and Regulatory Gaps: Why Affidavits Are Not Enough
The current system of asset disclosure relies on self-sworn affidavits submitted to the Election Commission at the time of filing nominations. While this represents progress compared to the pre-2003 era when no disclosures were required, the system has fundamental weaknesses.
First, there is no systematic verification of affidavit contents. MLAs self-report their assets, liabilities, and income, but the Election Commission lacks the investigative machinery to verify these declarations against actual property records, bank statements, and business filings. Ujjaini Halim of the ADR notes, "We are not sure if there is any scrutiny of the affidavits filed by any MP or MLA across the country".
Second, the affidavits only capture a snapshot at election time—every five years. What happens to assets in between elections remains unmonitored. An MLA could acquire substantial wealth during their term, and unless they seek re-election, this would never come to light through the affidavit system.
Third, penalties for false declarations are rarely enforced. While the Representation of the People Act provides for rejection of nomination papers for non-disclosure or false disclosure of assets, prosecutions are exceedingly rare. The Supreme Court in 2013 ruled that even criminally convicted MPs and MLAs could be disqualified only after exhausting all appeals—a process that can take decades.
Fourth, assets can be easily hidden through proxies—relatives, associates, or shell companies that don't appear in affidavits. The requirement to declare spouse and dependent assets provides some check, but sophisticated wealth-holders can structure their holdings through extended family networks or business entities that escape disclosure requirements.
The Lokpal Act of 2013 mandated annual asset declarations by public servants, but its implementation has been weak and subject to repeated amendments. A 2016 amendment bill sought to modify asset declaration requirements, but it remains pending, leaving the enforcement mechanism in limbo.
Case Studies: Individual Legislators Under Scrutiny
Sujit Bose: The Minister Under Investigation
Sujit Bose, the Trinamool Congress MLA from Bidhannagar and a minister in the West Bengal government, exemplifies the nexus between political power and wealth accumulation. In January 2024, the Enforcement Directorate raided his residence for over 14 hours in connection with a civic recruitment scam.
Bose's assets increased from ₹1.32 crores in 2016 to ₹6.58 crores in 2021—a 396% jump and the sixth-highest growth rate among all MLAs. He declares his income from "business and bank interest," with annual earnings of ₹57.05 lakhs.
Following the raid, Bose held a press conference asserting his innocence and challenging anyone to prove corruption allegations against him, stating he would resign if such proof emerged. He claimed that throughout his 45-year political career, "not a single case of accepting financial benefits from anyone has been reported". However, the ED investigation continues, and the scale of his asset growth remains unexplained in relation to his declared income sources.
Partha Chatterjee: The Fallen Minister
Perhaps the most spectacular case of alleged corruption involves Partha Chatterjee, former West Bengal Education Minister and senior TMC leader. In July 2022, the ED arrested Chatterjee in connection with a massive cash-for-jobs scam involving illegal recruitment of teaching and non-teaching staff in government schools.
The ED claimed to have recovered ₹49.80 crores in cash, along with jewelry, gold bars, and property documents from flats owned by Chatterjee's alleged associate. The scale of the recovered assets shocked even seasoned observers of political corruption.
When Chatterjee approached the Supreme Court for bail in November 2024, the bench told his lawyer, "On the face of it you are a corrupt person. Crores of rupees were recovered from your premises. What message do you want us to send to society? That corrupt persons can get bail like this?".
Following his arrest, the Mamata Banerjee government removed Chatterjee from all ministerial positions, and the TMC stripped him of party posts including secretary general. However, his case illustrates how wealth accumulation can occur on a scale far beyond what appears in electoral affidavits—suggesting that the visible asset growth documented in this investigation may be only the tip of the iceberg.
Jyotsna Mandi: The 1,985% Growth Mystery
Jyotsna Mandi, an AITC MLA from the Ranibandh (ST) constituency in Bankura district, presented one of the most extreme cases of asset growth. Her assets increased by a staggering 1,985.68%—from ₹1.96 lakhs in 2016 to ₹41.01 lakhs in 2021.
While her absolute wealth remains relatively modest compared to crorepati MLAs, the rate of growth is mathematically extraordinary. To achieve such growth through legitimate means would require either a business venture with phenomenal returns or an inheritance or windfall—none of which appear in her declared income sources.
Mandi represents a Scheduled Tribe constituency, and her case raises questions about whether MLAs from marginalized communities face different pressures or opportunities for wealth accumulation.
The Complete Picture: All 292 MLAs
The West Bengal Legislative Assembly currently has 294 seats, though analysis covers 292 MLAs as two constituencies had delayed elections. The party composition as of 2021 stands at: All India Trinamool Congress (213 seats), Bharatiya Janata Party (77 seats), Rashtriya Secular Majlis Party (1 seat), and Independent (1 seat).
A comprehensive directory of all current MLAs reveals that the AITC dominates not just numerically but also in terms of wealth concentration. The ruling party holds 73% of assembly seats and accounts for an even higher proportion of total MLA wealth.
Key constituencies and their representatives include major urban centers where wealth accumulation has been most pronounced: Kolkata Port (Firhad Hakim), Kasba (Ahmed Javed Khan), Bidhannagar (Sujit Bose), and Jangipur (Jakir Hossain). These MLAs represent areas with significant economic activity, real estate development, and government contract flows—all potential sources of corruption and wealth accumulation.
Rural constituencies, particularly in districts like Purulia, Bankura, and Murshidabad, show more varied patterns, with some MLAs reporting very low assets while others—like Jakir Hossain from Murshidabad—rank among the wealthiest.
Recommendations for Reform
Based on this investigation's findings, several reforms merit serious consideration:
1. Mandatory Annual Asset Declarations: MLAs should be required to file annual asset declarations, not just at election time. This would enable tracking of wealth accumulation throughout their tenure and make it harder to hide sudden increases.
2. Independent Verification: Asset declarations should be subject to independent verification by agencies with access to property records, bank accounts, and business filings. The Election Commission should be empowered with investigative machinery or should coordinate with income tax authorities and enforcement agencies.
3. Source of Assets Explanation: When asset increases exceed a certain threshold relative to declared income (for example, 50% of annual income), MLAs should be required to provide detailed explanations with supporting documentation.
4. Stronger Penalties: False declarations should carry mandatory disqualification and criminal penalties, strictly enforced without the current delays and loopholes.
5. Campaign Finance Transparency: Complete transparency in political party financing, including disclosure of all donors and expenditures, would help trace money flows from parties to individual politicians.
6. Conflict of Interest Regulations: MLAs should be barred from engaging in businesses that directly benefit from government contracts or regulatory decisions in areas they influence.
7. Public Asset Disclosure Portal: All MLA asset declarations should be available on an easily searchable public portal, enabling citizens and journalists to monitor and question wealth accumulation.
Conclusion: Democracy's Balance Sheet
The extraordinary wealth accumulation documented in this investigation raises profound questions about the state of democracy in West Bengal. When the average MLA's assets increase by 272% over a decade while the state's economy underperforms and citizens migrate in search of work, the social contract appears broken.
The concentration of wealth within the ruling party—with nine of the top ten wealth accumulators belonging to AITC—suggests that political power correlates directly with personal enrichment. This creates perverse incentives where seeking office becomes a path to wealth accumulation rather than public service.
The parallel rise in criminalization—with 49% of current MLAs facing criminal cases—compounds the concern. A legislature where half the members face legal troubles and the majority have grown substantially richer during their tenure is poorly positioned to serve as a check on executive power or to legislate in the public interest.
Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee's personal austerity stands in stark contrast to her party colleagues' wealth accumulation. This paradox may insulate her from direct allegations, but it also raises questions about her awareness and control over the party's financial ecosystem.
The investigation's findings are based entirely on publicly available data from self-sworn affidavits submitted to the Election Commission and analyzed by the Association for Democratic Reforms. This means the reality may be worse, as sophisticated wealth-holders can hide assets through nominees and offshore mechanisms that never appear in disclosures.
For West Bengal's citizens, the message is clear: over the past decade, their representatives have prospered even as the state struggled. The data suggests that entering politics in West Bengal has become a lucrative career path—far more rewarding than the ₹15 lakhs annual honorarium would suggest.
True democratic accountability requires not just the right to vote every five years, but continuous monitoring of those in power. This investigation represents a small step toward that goal, shining light on the wealth accumulated by people's representatives. Whether this knowledge translates into electoral consequences or systemic reform remains to be seen.
The citizens of West Bengal deserve leaders who grow their state, not just their personal bank accounts. Until wealth accumulation by MLAs is properly investigated, explained, or prosecuted, the credibility of representative democracy in the state will remain under question.
